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ABSTRACT
Accountability has been increasingly emphasized as a key to
improving the quality and inclusiveness of basic education.
However, reforms around the world inspired by this line of think-
ing have only generated lackluster results. The paper examines
the gaps between theoretical expectations and the actual practi-
ces of individual accountability measures, and explores ways to
bridge them. It argues that the more fundamental shortcomings
of these reforms are the result of a partial understanding of the
concept of accountability, in which the role of the government is
either neglected or very narrowly emphasized. It concludes that
government stewardship is vital in tackling these informational,
incentive, and capacity challenges facing the sector and making
education accountability reforms more coherent, coordinated,
and practical.
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1. Introduction: why accountability matters in education
The importance of basic education in economic and human development has been
widely recognized in both policy research and practice. However, it was not until the
1990s that the importance of accountability in education began to be highlighted.
With impressive progress in universalizing basic (especially primary) education
achieved under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), focus gradually shifted
to quality and inclusiveness, as reflected in the fourth Sustainable Development Goal
(SDG4). The emphasis on inclusiveness targets those who are still left behind in the
school system despite remarkable overall improvements in terms of the accessibility
of basic education. More fundamentally, keeping children at school would be mean-
ingful only when the quality aspects are looked after as well. In other words, school-
ing has to facilitate learning. Indeed, schools are the primary places in which students
are educated into responsible citizens, employable labor force, and skilled and know-
ledgeable individuals. While the details vary, the overall goal of basic education is
now widely accepted as promoting student learning in an inclusive manner.
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In light of the changed emphasis in the goal, input-based interventions that trad-
itionally worked well for access expansion and enrollment increase can no longer be
relied upon primarily to promote quality and inclusiveness in education. More
important now is how efficiently and effectively are fiscal, physical and human
resources managed and utilized; i.e. how governance of basic education is organized.
Accountability is especially underlined as an integral component of governance, as
reflected both in recent conceptualization (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000) and in
reports by international organizations (e.g. World Bank 2003).
2. Education accountability reforms: theory and practice
Acknowledging that accountability is of high importance to the governance of basic
education, numerous education reforms targeted at strengthening accountability have
been launched in many parts of the world. Yet instead of having any consensual def-
inition over what education accountability is across the extant literature that emerges
out of these reforms, the word “accountability” is often used quite loosely and some-
times even taken for granted. Having said so, these reforms do expect a variety of
actors in the education sector to give certain types of information (or “account”) to
other relevant parties, to which feedback is given in the forms of sanctions, punish-
ments, reward and so on.
In general, the reforms touch upon four broad themes: choice and competition,
autonomy and participation, threat-induced improvements, and rewards and support.
Theoretical justifications for each of these aspects as well as the actual reform practi-
ces are abundantly scrutinized in the literature and summarized in systematic reviews
and syntheses of evidence (e.g. Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011; Mbiti 2016; Evans
and Popova 2016 etc.) They are surveyed in the rest of this section to illustrate that
when viewed against the experience of both developing and developed countries, it is
far from clear that the reforms have lived up to the expectations of enhancing student
learning in spite of enthusiastic hypes and large investments.
2.1 Accountability through choice and competition
Education reforms are launched primarily in the hope of boosting the lackluster per-
formance of government schools. One solution widely advocated by the economists
since Friedman (1962) is the use of vouchers. Later on, full privatization of education
service provision is also encouraged in the advent of New Public Management
reforms. The private sector is generally believed by the advocates here to be account-
ability-enhancing given closer pay-performance link within the sector. Introducing it
as an alternative education provider will, therefore, exert pressure on government
schools to improve their performance. In that case, all that is needed is to give
parents information and choices, so that they can trigger such pressure by exiting
underperforming (government) schools.
Despite the emergence of privatization and even the mushrooming of the so-called
“low-cost private schools”, the majority of the socio-economically disadvantaged in
many developing countries still have to rely mostly on government schools. In that
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case, even when the traditionally privileged private schools still outperform a majority
of government schools (i.e. when the logic of choice and competition is sound for
those who have switched to private education), if the former’s positive experience
does not generate wider implications for the entire system, then the existing gaps
between these schools and the rest may further be enlarged. Indeed, most well-per-
forming schools in the private sector do not necessarily have the incentive to share or
diffuse their good practice system-wise in the first place. As for the “low-cost private
schools”, whether they have achieved the goal of improving student learning overall
as an accountability mechanism remains much less clear, despite their valuable role
in expanding the access to basic education (e.g. Tooley 2009).
Compared with the scale of privatization in general, the adoption of vouchers is
limited to fewer countries. Even in cases where the performance of government
schools is found to have improved under competition pressure, the results are uneven
as voucher schools may “cream skim” the most advantaged or motivated students
(Epple, Romano, and Urquiola 2017). It is further observed that reports that are sup-
posed to guide parental choices are often designed in a way that barely contains com-
prehensible and digestible information (Bell 2005; Garcia 2011). This mixed evidence
and practical difficulties, therefore, make it questionable whether resorting to market
forces can indeed justify the marginalization of the government in these reforms, not
to mention the complete substitution of its involvement.
2.2 Accountability through autonomy and participation
Compared with privatization and voucher programs, decentralization and school-
based management (SBM) reforms have been more popular with both scholars across
various disciplines and development practitioners from international organizations
and donor agencies. Accordingly, these reforms have been adopted on a larger scale
over a longer time period.
Despite a similar distrust on government as the traditional service provider, the
exact ways in which government is marginalized in decentralization reforms are
markedly different from those in privatization reforms mentioned above. Unlike the
latter which put considerable trust on the force of the market, decentralization and
SBM reforms emphasize more on parental and community participation to holding
schools accountable, while also granting schools and local governments more auton-
omy, so that their “local knowledge” can be better harnessed.
Similar to how privatization and voucher reforms have fared so far, results of
decentralization appear to be uneven as they tend to help countries or regions with
abundant resources get better at the cost of the least advantaged population. This
polarizing effect is found in both cross-country studies (e.g. Hanushek, Link, and
Woessman 2013) and within-country analyses (e.g. Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky
2008). While the post-decentralization increase of education expenditure is sometimes
labeled as pro-poor (e.g. Faguet and Sanchez 2008) and is found to be accompanied
by an improvement in enrollment and literacy, its impact on quality and inclusiveness
of education remains less investigated. Impact of decentralization and SBM reforms is
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further conditioned on the type of decentralization being studied (e.g. fiscal or polit-
ical) and the extent of actual autonomy enjoyed by local government or the schools.
2.3 Accountability through threat
While government schools are increasingly facing horizontal competition from other
(private) schools and parental scrutiny through privatization and decentralization
reforms, some forms of control from the government still remain. These schools are
thus accountable to government authorities mainly through the latter’s threat of sanc-
tions based on school inspections and the performance of its students in standardized
high-stake exams.
The practices are common in the United States under the mandate of the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, but positive findings on threat-induced improvements
overall are often shadowed by the strategic behaviors of the schools (De Wolf and
Janssens 2007). For instance, “education triage” refers to the phenomenon in which
schools divert resources to students with a higher chance of marginal pass from those
already well below or above the threshold (Lauen and Gaddis 2016). Other study
found that students may even be discouraged from taking the high-stake exams
(known as the “reshaping of the test pool” in Figlio and Getzler 2006). In Europe,
inspections are also found to be accompanied by side effects from “teaching to the
test” to the discouragement from innovative pedagogy (Jones et al. 2017).
By contrast, inspections are far rarer in developing countries where information,
infrastructural and personnel prerequisites are more difficult to be met (Gershberg,
Meade, and Andersson 2009; World Bank 2018). When happened against all these
odds, they are usually reduced to mechanically checking register maintenance and
collecting enrollment information. Aspects that are really related to student learning
often remain off the radar. Such exercise poses burdens not only to teachers and to
principals at the receiving end, but also on inadequately-supported local officials
implementing them. In sum, it may seem that the government is still fulfilling its role
in education governance and ensuring school accountability here. However, existing
evidence suggests that if such a role is exercised through threatening measures only,
without adequate support or clear understanding on local situations in the first place,
inspections will be accompanied by many undesirable side effects at best and be
counterproductive at worst.
Another form of threat-induced improvement is expected from the teachers. In
many developing countries facing chronic teacher shortages, hiring contract teachers is
championed as a cost-effective solution that also enhances accountability through job
insecurity and closer pay-performance link. In other words, it is believed that having to
perform in order to renew contract will stimulate efforts from contract teachers.
Some randomized-control trial (RCT) evaluations did confirm the cost-effective-
ness of these practices (e.g. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2013). However, the
absolute effort level of contract teachers often remains low (Goyal and Pandey 2013).
More importantly, competition and pressure that this measure brings is exclusive to
contract teachers only; regular teachers are largely unaffected, although the workload
between the two may not see substantial differences.
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In terms of the recruitment of these teachers, the task has been delegated to local
bodies as a part of the larger decentralization initiative in some cases. In others (Delhi,
India for instance), candidates for guest teacher posts still need to go through eligibility
tests organized by the state government. While the latter practice bears no substantial
differences from the recruitment of regular teachers, contract teachers are usually
excluded from welfare, training and promotion prospects enjoyed by regular teachers.
These limitations summarized above, therefore, have raised serious concerns that in the
long run, such practice may dampen rather than strengthen their motivations.
2.4 Accountability, reward and support
To improve and restore the motivations of teachers and school management, it is
gradually recognized that reward and support, especially from the government, are
also needed alongside threats, pressure, and sanctions. The most common reward
studied in the literature is performance pay. It is expected to strengthen teacher and
school accountability as the payment is, by definition, made on the basis of teacher
performance in facilitating student learning. Short-run motivational effects may be
further joined by the selection effects over time, as performance pay is hoped to
attract and retain capable teachers in the profession while pushing out the underper-
forming ones.
Notwithstanding the cogent arguments, how “performance” can be best measured
remains a practical difficulty for most performance pay programs. Operationalizing
teacher performance with student exam scores, albeit the most commonly used method
worldwide, is not without criticisms. And even when the “performance indicators” are
chosen, how the “pay” is designed may also lead to substantial differences as for the
strength of motivational and selection effects. Payment based on individual teacher per-
formance has seen more success than group-based incentives which have a larger scope
for free-riding. Yet even the former cannot guarantee improved student outcomes unfail-
ingly. Different formats of payment (e.g. “pay for percentile”, “pay for score gains” etc.)
and whether such criteria are transparent to and well understood by teachers may also
have varying impacts. On the other hand, too high-powered incentives may divert teacher
efforts into “teaching to the test” or causing grade inflation.
Incentives and capacity of teachers and school administrators can also be enhanced
through organizational support such as in-service training. However, its relevance in
improving accountability has not been sufficiently explored in the existing literature.
More success seems to be found in individual training programs in developed countries
(e.g. Angrist and Lavy 2001) than in developing countries (e.g. Zhang et al. 2013).
Evidence also suggests that how training is actually implemented is also important for
its effectiveness. How various structural factors matter exactly is less clear though.
3. Between promises and performance: three key challenges
Beyond the various deficits of individual accountability reforms as summarized above,
a more fundamental problem that lies between the promises and performance of the
reforms is a partial understanding of the very concept of accountability.
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As mentioned in the beginning of the last section, accountability in basic education
is comprised of a set of relationships between different pairs of stakeholders (e.g. gov-
ernment and schools, parents and schools, parents and government, schools and
teachers etc.) which contain both the “account-giving” of the latter and feedback of
the former. It is, therefore, worth highlighting that for most reforms to be effective, a
set of key information is indispensable. Reforms should also be incentive-compatible
with both the targets of accountability measures and their implementers. Finally, a
certain threshold of capacity will be needed to turn the theoretical expectations
into reality.
Yet instead of seeing education accountability as a comprehensive and multi-stake-
holder complex and giving due recognition to the importance of information, incen-
tives and capacity involved in the process, reforms under different themes so far tend
to have specific and often-times quite narrow focus. Notably, the government is either
relegated to the margins in some reforms; or when it is not, there tends to be an
unbalanced emphasis on discipline and control over support and reward. When the
role of the government is partially understood and inadequately fulfilled, three funda-
mental challenges are likely to constrain reforms taken in piecemeal manners from
reaching full potentials. As will be illustrated below, some reform practices have sub-
stantially weakened the reform efforts by making information difficult to comprehend,
frustrating stakeholder incentives and enlarging the capacity vacuum in the process.
3.1 The challenges of information and its delivery
Undoubtedly, nearly all accountability reforms require certain types of information
inputs. For instance, both school inspections and performance pay programs are sup-
posedly based on a set of criteria along various dimensions. However, such criteria
are rarely made transparent to stakeholders at whom these reforms target. To be fair,
some studies do evaluate the dissemination of information and, not surprisingly, have
found mixed results, whether the information being provided is to students on return
of schooling (Jensen 2010; c.f. Loyalka et al. 2013), to parents regarding children per-
formance (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2017; c.f. Banerjee et al. 2010), or to schools
and teachers under the name of diagnostic feedback (de Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and
Patrinos 2017; c.f. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2010).
What seems to be ignored is that the design of information and the way it is com-
municated matters crucially. While transparency is generally preferable to the lack of
it, useful information also has to be clear, concise and relevant. However, information
supplied to parents to assist their school choice decisions is often found either too
scant or overwhelmingly encyclopedic (Garcia 2011), which has especially put those
parents with lower literacy into disadvantage (Delale-O’Connor 2018). On the other
hand, decentralization reforms are more likely to foster fruitful ties between schools,
communities, and government when information is shared in a collegial and collab-
orative manner, rather than government being dictating and coercive (Pradhan et al.
2014; Mangla 2015).
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3.2 The challenges of incentives and motivations
Another key aspect that deserves more attention is the incentives of and situations
faced by local stakeholders, especially teachers and the school management at the
frontline. Whenever new accountability reforms are introduced by governments, they
are rarely consulted regarding what they think about the reforms, or whether such
reforms are really needed or welcomed and why.
One reason behind the dismissal of their opinions is that when they are portrayed
as self-seeking “agents” who advance their own interest at the cost of that of the
“principals,” their motivation is assumed to be low (World Bank 2017). Less recogni-
tion is given to the possibility that teacher absence or other presumably self-seeking
behaviors may be due to practical difficulties and a lack of supportive measures to
alleviate them. Nevertheless, if such important ground-level contexts continue to be
ignored, reforms seeking to impose discipline and sanctions on teachers and schools
may be counterproductive by dampening their motivations.
3.3 The challenges of local capacity
The concept of “capacity” in the policy or governance literature usually refers to the
resources and skills, or competencies and capabilities, necessary to perform policy
functions, which exist at three different levels (individual, organizational, and sys-
temic) and contain three different types or components (analytical, operational, and
political, Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett 2015).
Unlike the literature in general which has attached great importance to this con-
cept as a key to account for policy and governance outcomes (e.g. Howlett and
Ramesh 2015), the challenge of local capacity, or rather the lack of it, is poorly
addressed in education accountability reforms so far. Results of voucher programs
and SBM reforms are constant reminders that not all parents, local governments or
school management are well equipped to utilize their newly acquired choice and
autonomy productively (Carr-Hill et al. 2018). There are similar observations that
performance pay is only effective when teachers are capable of knowing “what know-
ledge and pedagogical skills are needed to improve student learning” (Vegas and
Umansky 2005). This is in sharp contrast with the situation of stakeholders in better-
off regions who have abundant resources at their disposal and are thus less likely to
suffer from capacity deficits. In that case, inequality will further be worsened both
across and within regions, as alerted by the uneven results of various reforms from
decentralization to vouchers and performance pay.
4. Discussion: how government can tackle the challenges
Given these steep challenges, improvement in education outcomes cannot be achieved
when accountability reforms are adopted in a piecemeal manner, even when they
have strong theoretical backing, whether from economics, political science, or political
economy. As such, making reforms work would not only need multiple measures to
be taken, but they should be taken in a coherent and coordinated manner that syner-
gizes with and corroborates, rather than undermines or contradicts each other (Peters
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2018). In facilitating the former and avoiding the latter, government also plays a vital
role in addressing the information, incentive, and capacity challenges identi-
fied above.
For instance, capacity-building for parents and school managers in the form of
government-sponsored training have made their participation and contribution more
meaningful in the Philippines and Niger (Khattri, Ling, and Jha 2012; Koazuka 2018).
Especially in the latter case, a previous intervention of government grants without
training in the same context has seen grants only utilized for items that did not
improve learning (Beasley and Huillery 2017). How training has improved resource
management, parental/community awareness and ultimately, student outcomes, in
that case, is thus even more remarkable. In better-performing education systems such
as those in Singapore and Beijing, there are also various practices in which govern-
ment either induces or makes compulsory that well-performing or “leading” govern-
ment schools share experiences and good practices with other schools in the system1
(e.g. Meng, Zhang, and She 2016).
Another form of capacity-building that can be delivered by the government is the
co-production of education initiatives with school committees. This also serves to
reignite the motivations of the latter, as they are built into a bridge between the com-
munity and the school. Positive results on student learning are found on this inter-
vention in Indonesia, also in contrast to the insignificant effect of grants alone
(Pradhan et al. 2014).
Apart from capacity-building assistance for those with capacity deficits, the govern-
ment can help restore the incentives of frontline service providers by signaling that
they are not treated as unmotivated or self-seeking agents, but cherished as true pro-
fessionals. Unlike performance pay and other one-shot financial incentives which
work mainly on extrinsic motivations whose impact tends to diminish over time, pro-
fessional development through in-service training and promotion arrangements
offered by the government can further tap into and reinforce intrinsic motivations.
Regular sharing and application of what is discussed in the training can foster a posi-
tive learning loop, whereas fair and timely promotion can instill respect for teaching
excellence as the most valuable asset of the system. Of course, to make such institu-
tionalized support truly helpful, it needs to be designed and delivered in such a way
that matches the needs of teachers and principals, for which consultation with them
is highly necessary so as to learn about their situations and perceptions.
Finally, the government also has substantial scope to act on the lesson that the
design and communication of information matters. To begin with, it is increasingly
recognized that dominant indicators of “education outcomes” (e.g. high-stake exam
scores or regulation compliance), albeit valuable, can hardly reflect the entirety of
“student learning” (World Bank 2017). Utility of such information is further con-
strained by the side effects it may bring, as mentioned in Section 3. If these types of
information can be supplemented with lower-stake ones (i.e. not used for punishment
and reward decisions), then it is more likely that frontline education providers would
share frankly about the real challenges and opportunities on the ground.
Second, for a more comprehensive and balanced understanding of “teacher per-
formance”, their professional development would be an indispensable component too.
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In other words, whether teachers are able to update subject knowledge, enhance
teaching skills, collaborate with and learn from peers etc. (Jensen et al. 2016) matters,
in addition to the aptitude of those students that they teach. In light of the accumu-
lating evidence that factors such as teacher certification, level of education, and years
of experience can barely explain or predict their effectiveness in improving student
learning (Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander 2007; Podgursky and Springer 2007; Kane,
Rockoff, and Staiger 2008), boosting teacher quality through professional development
would be considered even more important. Not only is this crucial for regular teach-
ers, but contract teachers in systems that do hire them should not be neglected either.
A combination of all the above-mentioned types of information, collected through
both standardized methods and genuine dialogs, will thus help the government better
diagnose local conditions and devise support accordingly.
Having a more holistic and in-depth understanding of the information needed to
making accountability work does not mean that government should provide all such
information indiscriminately to all stakeholders. Rather, to make the delivery of infor-
mation more effective, the information to be disseminated to different stakeholders
can also be different with varying degrees and formats of government involvement.
For instance, parents are more likely to respond positively when test scores of their
children are disseminated by teachers with diagnostic feedback that has a personal
touch. Information given to parents by the school can include briefings on school-
level performance together with district or even municipal benchmarks, or whether
school infrastructure is ready to stimulate learning.
“Delegating” these two types of information provision to capable frontline educa-
tion service providers thus leaves the government better-positioned to disseminate the
more general types of information. Examples may include general parental participa-
tion guidelines, system-level status, and progress, as well as overall budgeting and
spending plans. While such information does not seem directly relevant to the
accountability relationship between parents on one hand, and teachers and schools as
frontline service providers on the other, its role as a benchmark and initial reference
remains non-negligible. This may, in turn, facilitate vision alignment among stake-
holders through the identification of system-level gaps and deliberation of improve-
ment plans. Of course, government may need to avoid too specific forms of high-
powered publicity (such as ranking) which can impose counter-productive pressure
onto schools, or too complicated ones that parents may find difficult to understand
(Garcia 2011).
5. Conclusion: government stewardship remains vital
In light of the indispensable role of the government, relegating it to the margin as
implied in many of the reforms examined here will be practically unhelpful, although
it might be understandable when looking back at the generally unfavorable record of
government involvement in basic education.
Having said so, recognizing the central role of government in making accountabil-
ity work does not mean that such a role should be played out in a monolithic man-
ner of command and control. As mentioned, one advantage of consulting local
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stakeholders is that it can give the government some initial ideas about local contexts
that have largely been ignored by the reform initiatives so far. Accordingly, in cases
where local interactions are sound and that local stakeholders are capable of deliver-
ing a task, be it hiring a contract teacher to fulfill the specific needs of the school or
facilitating effective parental involvement, government would serve more as “quality
assurance” by specifying a broad set of expected outcomes and standards for bench-
marking references. Only when local capacity is missing may government support be
given more directly.
To illustrate, schools in disadvantaged communities may not have the capacity to
conduct even the most basic and standardized form of in-service teacher training.
Instead of leaving these laggard schools behind in the name of decentralization and
autonomy, government may need to provide such training based on teachers’ needs
and difficulties faced in their day-to-day teaching and student management. For the
rest, not only is school the most convenient place for training in terms of infrastruc-
ture and logistics, it is also the place where most frequent interactions between teach-
ers and students, between school management and teachers, and even amongst
teacher themselves, occur. Therefore, for schools that are capable of delivering it, they
remain a natural nodal point to gather and gauge training needs and the most suit-
able venue for training in a format like a lesson observation and collective lesson-
planning, which can especially strengthen what is called “peer accountability” (Jensen
et al. 2016).
Likewise, not only is a professionally designed career advancement system compat-
ible with the incentives and motivations of teachers and principals. When teachers
promoted as such are invited to train their more junior colleagues, they are also shar-
ing a task that traditionally falls under the government. Incorporating them in train-
ing provision as “insiders” may, in fact, be more effective than delivering all training
by outsiders (e.g. university professors or experts in state authorities). Not only do
they know better the needs and challenges of their fellow teachers in everyday teach-
ing, their proposed solutions to addressing these issues also tend to be more
grounded on their experience and expertise that is already accredited by the promo-
tion system.
In sum, instead of treating as panacea any single accountability measure that so far
tends to portray government as either an “outsider” or above other stakeholders, edu-
cation accountability should be viewed as a complex of relationships amongst mul-
tiple stakeholders. Within this complex of accountability relationships, government’s
role can be better framed as a steward that helps align stakeholders’ varying goals to
the improvement of student learning and ensure they have both the incentives and
capacity towards fulfilling the aligned goals. To fulfill the crucial task of providing
stewardship, it needs to monitor, guide, coordinate and, if necessary, compel desired
behaviors through both disciplinary and control measures on one hand, and support
and reward on the other. In other words, measures from SBM to performance pay
are rather distinctive instruments at the government’s disposal, the usage or combin-
ation of which should be designed to match the local contexts, most notably the
needs and expectations of the local stakeholders in realizing a set of outcomes that
are not narrowly confined to high-stake exams only. Picturing government’s central
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role in this way helps generate a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of
education accountability, which in turn is a key step to making reforms work.
Notes
1. One of the practices in Singapore school system in this regard is the Primary Education
Review and Implementation Holistic Assessment. See “Primary Education Review and
Implementation Holistic Assessment Project in Singapore”, https://www.thecommonwealth-
educationhub.net/goodpractice/holistic-assessment-to-support-student-learning-and-development-
in-all-singapore-primary-schools/ accessed 2019-02-17.
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